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In 2011, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber published an influential arti-
cle [Mer cier & Sperber, 2011] arguing that human reasoning evolved 
for the purpose of argu mentation and serves that purpose well. Addi-
tional publications followed and now, in The Enigma of Reason, Mer-
cier and Sperber [2017] flesh out their theory. Indi vidual reasoning 
is often fallacious, in their view, because it applies reasoning beyond 
the scope of its evolutionary purpose. Logic, rather than a basis for 
reasoning, is a formalized system developed by logicians that has lit-
tle connection to actual human reasoning. 
This is a rich and readable book that presents many intriguing 
studies from the literature of human reasoning and addresses diverse 
philosophical and theoretical conceptualizations of human rational-
ity. In the end, however, I believe it has two se rious, and closely re-
lated, flaws: it ignores development and, as a result, misunder stands 
the nature of logic and its role in reasoning. 
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Mercier and Sperber’s Theory 
The Enigma of Reason begins by noting the longstanding concern of 
philoso phers with reason. It quickly turns to a scientific approach, by 
which it means an evo lutionary perspective: “With Darwin came the 
realization that whatever traits hu mans share as a species are not gifts 
of the gods but outcomes of biological evolution. Reason, being such a 
trait, must have evolved” [Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 1]. 
And what is it that has evolved? Whereas dual processing theorists 
such as Kahn eman [2011] posit “a contrast between intuition and rea-
soning as if these were two quite different forms of inference,” the 
present theory maintains instead “that reason ing is itself a kind of in-
tuitive inference” [Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 7]. Logicians, philoso-
phers, and psychologists of reasoning have greatly overemphasized the 
role of reflection in human inference because they themselves “com-
monly resort to higher-order arguments as part of their trade,” which 
is “hardly typical of the population at large.” Such theorists “mistake 
their own professional twist of mind for a basic human trait” [Mer-
cier & Sperber, 2017, p. 152]. 
Also in contrast to prevailing views, reasoning is seen as primar-
ily social rather than individual, a matter of argumentation rather 
than logic: 
Whereas reason is commonly viewed as a superior means 
to think better on one’s own, we argue that it is mainly used 
in our interactions with others. We produce reasons in or-
der to jus tify our thoughts and actions to others and to pro-
duce arguments to convince others to think and act as we 
suggest. We also use reason to evaluate not so much our own 
thought as the reasons others produce to justify themselves 
or to convince us. 
Whereas reasoning is commonly viewed as the use of 
logic, or at least some system of rules to expand and im-
prove our knowledge and our decisions, we argue that rea-
son is much more opportunistic and eclectic and is not bound 
to formal norms. [Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 7] 
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The role of logic in reasoning continues to be discussed through-
out the book. “Logic,” we are told repeatedly, “tells us neither how we 
reason nor how we should reason” [Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p. 174]. 
A section title firmly puts logic in its place: “In Reasoning, Logic Is a 
Heuristic Tool” [p. 158]. 
Central to the argument is a sharp distinction between logic and 
mathematics. Both logic and mathematics make use of ordinary lan-
guage but they differ fundamen tally, the authors argue, in their rela-
tion to language. Mathematics can be discussed in English, for exam-
ple, using words such as “one,” “two,” “thousand,” “million,” “plus,” 
“minus,” and “times,” but underlying the use of these linguistic ex-
pressions are what they call “mathematical facts” (p. 153). Presum-
ably such facts include, for example, the basic necessities of arithme-
tic: Three plus two always comes to exactly five, and subtracting two 
from five returns you to three. Two plus two plus two comes to six, 
and three times two must give the same result. 
But logic, argue Mercier and Sperber, is different. Logic, they as-
sume, derives from and relies entirely on language; unlike mathemat-
ics it has no deeper basis. Spe cifically, logic involves the use of words 
such as “if,” “then,” “and,” “or,” and “not,” which may reasonably be 
interpreted differently across different contexts. Thus logic, in their 
view, is pragmatic and contextual; it may sometimes contribute to rea-
soning but plays no special role. 
Evolution without Development 
The Enigma of Reason is an important contribution to the psychologi-
cal study of reasoning that challenges most prevailing views and will 
likely receive multiple cri tiques. One important basis for critique is 
that it does not take logic seriously enough. I argue here that the fail-
ure to take logic seriously is a failure to comprehend its na ture, which 
is in turn due to a failure to take development seriously. 
There is no denying the value of an evolutionary perspective on rea-
soning or any other psychological phenomenon. The human species is 
a product of evolution and can only be understood in light of its evo-
lution. But it is no less true that a person is a product of development 
and can only be understood in light of that development. This makes 
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little difference if development is driven by evolutionary instructions 
en coded in our genes. But research over the past half-century has 
made it increasingly clear that development can only be understood 
as a constructive process that coordi nates emerging structural rela-
tions across genetic, physiological, behavioral, environ mental, social, 
and cultural levels. Development is not determined by, and cannot be 
reduced to, genes or evolution. 
These matters have been discussed for decades by major devel-
opmental theorists including Richard Lerner, Willis Overton, Robert 
Lickliter, and David Witherington, all of whom remain understand-
ably frustrated by the continuing use of simplistic evolutionary models 
[Lerner & Overton, 2017; Lickliter & Witherington, 2017]. The present 
book would upset them literally from page 1, where reason (see the 
quote above about Darwin) is presented as an evolved trait. 
Oblivious to developmental considerations, Mercier and Sperber 
[2017] seem to construe people as collections of evolved traits. Each 
trait has evolved to serve some purpose and can be explained on the 
basis of that purpose. Reason is deemed a hu man trait that serves the 
social purpose of argumentation and is explained in those terms with 
no consideration of its development. I suggest here that extensive re-
search on the development of logical reasoning, which is entirely ig-
nored, is difficult to rec oncile with the present theory. 
The Development of Logical Reasoning 
The Enigma of Reason makes reasoning more enigmatic, rather than 
less, by ig noring nearly a century of developmental research. Contrary 
to any notion of logic as peripheral or exotic, research on the develop-
ment of logical reasoning and metalogi cal understanding shows early 
logic and systematic progress over the course of child hood and often 
beyond [Moshman, 1990, 2011, 2015]. Logic is implicit in norms of bi-
ological self-regulation and can be seen, long before the emergence of 
language, in the increasingly coordinated sensorimotor cognition of 
infants [Langer, 1980, 1986; Piaget, 1971]. 
As children begin to talk, it becomes increasingly clear that they 
are routinely mak ing inferences that can be recognized by logicians 
and psychologists as logical, though the children themselves do not 
initially comprehend the inferential nature of their cog nition, much 
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less the logic of their inferences. Beginning about age six, children 
recog nize inferences as a potential source of knowledge and show 
some understanding of logical necessity, consistency, and impossi-
bility. Further development shows system atic progress as they go on 
to construct increasingly reflective understandings of the difference 
between logical knowledge of necessities and empirical knowledge 
of con tingent matters about the world [Moshman, 1990, 2011, 2015; 
Smith, 1993]. 
Early mathematical development is in large part a matter of com-
ing to under stand the logic of number, counting, and simple arithme-
tic. Also beginning around age six, children treat mathematical truths 
like logical truths in distinguishing them from empirical facts and so-
cial conventions. There is no basis for the sharp distinc tion Mercier 
and Sperber make between mathematics and logic. Classifying these 
together, Piaget distinguished logicomathematical knowledge from 
empirical knowl edge and showed that this is a distinction made not 
just by philosophers such as Kant, but by virtually everyone beyond 
the age of 6 or 7 years. 
The development of logicomathematical knowledge appears to be 
an ongoing constructive process in which knowledge implicit in in-
ference at any level becomes an object of reflection, which generates 
more explicit knowledge about logic, which guides higher levels of rea-
soning. Far from a “professional twist of mind,” research shows re-
flection to be a fundamental process of developmental change in the 
logico mathematical realm [Moshman, 1990, 2011, 2015; Piaget, 2001; 
Smith 1993]. 
The developmental literature does not contradict the rich litera-
ture showing that adults frequently and systematically fail to meet 
norms of logic and rationality [Kahn eman, 2011]. But it does show 
that adolescents and adults, when reasoning at their best, show ad-
vanced forms of logical reasoning and metalogical understanding 
never seen among 8-year-olds, who in turn show logical competen-
cies beyond those of 4-year-olds, who are already logical in important 
ways that can be traced back to the sensorimotor cognition of infancy 
and, further, to the normative self-regulation of biological systems. 
The Enigma of Reason is certainly correct that there is more to rea-
soning than logic, but there is much more to logic than the proposed 
theory ac knowledges. 
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The Epistemic Basis of Reasoning 
Mercier and Sperber [2017] see reasoning as metacognitive in some 
ways, but they do not see it as epistemic. In their view, reasoning 
evolved as a pragmatic instru ment to serve particular social purposes, 
not to determine the truth, so any truth that results is mostly inciden-
tal. Justification is crucial to argumentation, but justification, in the 
proposed theory, is neither based on logic nor aimed at truth. 
This view is in sharp contrast to that of most philosophers, and es-
pecially epis temologists, who see truth as a necessary condition of 
knowledge. But Mercier and Sperber understand that they are chal-
lenging standard philosophical views. What they do not seem to real-
ize is that they are also challenging the epistemic cognition of ordinary 
people [Moshman, 2015]. By the age of 4 years, children recognize that 
be liefs can be false; for many years after that they construct increas-
ingly sophisticated conceptions of truth, justification, and knowledge. 
This epistemic development is reflected in increasingly sophisticated 
argumentation. It is not clear how the pro posed theory can account 
for this. Why would evolution generate a universal course of individ-
ual development toward false and useless ideas about logic and truth? 
But a moderate version of the proposed theory is much more plau-
sible. Human beings develop in social contexts that encourage argu-
mentation from very early ages and such argumentation plays a ma-
jor role in the development of reasoning, which includes logic but 
also includes reasons that are not strictly deductive, such as appeals 
to evidence, principle, or precedent. There are epistemic domains of 
reasoning be yond the logicomathematical domain [Moshman, 2015]. 
No other species develops nearly as far as human beings in rea-
soning and ratio nality, presumably for evolutionary reasons, but 
evolution alone does not account for argumentation, reasoning, or 
any other aspect of rationality. Logical and epistemic development 
through childhood and beyond requires both individual agency and 
social transactions. 
Conclusion 
The proposed theory, I have argued, is best viewed as complementary 
to stan dard views, rather than an alternative theory. It offers much of 
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value but cannot re place existing theoretical conceptions, in part be-
cause of evidence supporting those conceptions. 
With regard to the emphasis on argumentation, reasoning is both 
social and in dividual, with reciprocal influences across multiple lev-
els. Perhaps we have underes timated the social aspect of reasoning 
as a collaborative activity, a claim worth con sidering, but there is no 
need to disparage the epistemic agency and development of individu-
als and much evidence to remind us not to do so. 
With regard to development, evolutionary accounts must acknowl-
edge and ex plain developmental processes, sequences, and outcomes. 
People are not collections of evolved traits. The conceptualization of 
reason as a trait draws our attention away from its development and 
thus undermines our understanding of its nature, includ ing its rela-
tion to logic. 
Finally, reasoning is indeed much more than logic, and the present 
work helps us see better the many ways in which this is so. But rea-
soning sometimes properly relies on strict deduction and its associ-
ated possibilities, impossibilities, and necessi ties. Logic is crucial to 
much of our reasoning whether we know it or not, and we are better 
off if we know it. 
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